Sunday, February 24, 2019

Is the U.S. prepared for another terrorist attack? Essay

In the wash of the terrorist besets of 9/11, securing the expanse has be beat a case priority. The offsprings of 9/11 were the first rounds on the United States (U.S.) since Pearl Harbor which catapulted the U.S. into World contend II. As of the make-up of this account, the U.S. has been engaged in the war on act of terrorism for 13 age. During this goal of time the U.S. has been kept free from terrorist attacks by change overs to laws, technology, and investigative methods to combat terrorist act internation eachy. Although in that respect overhear been a number of changes to U.S. law and American citizens ca-ca been kept safe, the threat of act of terrorism has non abated. With the continued threat of terrorism to the U.S. and its citizens, there is a high prob strength that the U.S. will suffer other 9/11 type of issue. The U.S. has yieldn its resolve in recouping from 9/11 and the m some(prenominal) instinctive fortuitys that bring occurred since and is preparing for incidents in the futurity. there is a plethora of education and studies conducted after 9/11 that, in great detail, informed us to the extent we failed to pr face the events of 9/11. Ironically, in the historic period after the creation of the Department of motherland Security (DHS) many academics looking we are no safer now than we were prior to 9/11. In a historical context, the U.S. has been replyive in nature to every major disaster it has endured.The cycle of disaster events has repeated it egotism over and over throughout our history. The U.S. experiences a major response event, fails in the initial response and retrieval efforts, endures congressional investigations, obtains funding tofix the failures, execute the recovery effort, and return to a complacence mentality until another major event occurs. The purpose of this paper is to visit the oppugn of the U.S. readiness in the event there is another terrorist attack. I plan to accent on the aspec t of expression, reforms, and interagency coordination before and after the b placeing terrorist attack. This paper will argue that the preparation for a terrorist attack is need its not a question of how an attack is orchestrated. The question is the U.S. fain for another terrorist attack and recovery? Literature ReviewIn Perrys (2001) analysis he explains the actions that the U.S. needs to take in preparation for the following(a) attack. The holds publication is nether the premise of a worst case scenario as it pertained to terrorism in 2001. The primary focus of the article was the U.S. preparation for any delivery method terrorist organizations could provide. There was a concern that terrorist organizations could/would buy thermonuclear weapon platforms from rogue Soviet BLOC nations. The only way these attacks could be scotch was by the mix of three strategies deterrence, vetoion, and defense. The ability for the U.S. to use constituted forces to deter enemies needed to be maintained as well as the intelligence community with an aggressive campaign against nations that sponsor terrorism.In the article, The near Attack, Flynn (2007) provides a frame land in which terrorist organization detonates a bomb at an oil refinery, near Philadelphias Citizen Bank Park, that results in the release of a chemical cloud comprised of chemicals used in the refinery process. The cloud kills thousands over a ten day period as a result of respiration the fumes. In the aftermath of 9/11 the U.S. judicature concluded there was no way they could protect every essential asset and chose to specifically defend decisive substructure networks. It was believed that terrorists would only attack large tar puts that they could get the biggest return on investment.Flynn excessivelyk a very critical view of the U.S. governments response to compiling a list of high care for targets that needed protection, It wasnt rocket apprehension to figure that out, and it took five y ears to complete.Flynn further explained a need for manufacturing industries to utilize safer production methods known inherently as safer technology. The technology has a higher follow, hardly Flynn does an impressive cost comparison that the change-over could cost nationwide for around $250 million, which is what was being spent periodical on the war in Iraq.In Interagency Coordination in answer to terrorism Promising Practices and Barriers Identified in Four Countries (Strom and Eyerman 2007) is an article that examines our nations ability to prepare, respond, and recover from terrorism hinging on multiagency coordination. The focal point of the article is the explanation of the problems that existed pre-9/11 and the progress law enforcement agencies and public health agencies realise in coordination with each other across eightfold jurisdictions and countries. The article explains in detail the coordination problems that occur when two or more agencies are snarly in the s ame incident. There is a competitor for command and control, funding, purpose little system and processes across multiple agencies.Two primary problems that were noted were the inability for all agencies to achieve an interoperable dialogues system to aid in interagency cooperation. The second problem is barriers to communication ranging from coordination and cultural barriers and the overlook of proactive information share-out among multiple agencies. The authors noted several changes that needed to occur in order to be successful. The primary focus tholepining on ceasing interagency disputation for funding as this has created fraud, waste, and abuse across multiple U.S. agencies. The second focus was fostering a liaison model and incorporating public-private partnerships as individual companies have systematically been delegated the responsibility of protecting their own businesses. Methodology and Research strategyThe literature review has produced some excellent talking points that may show the U.S. government is not prepared for another 9/11 terrorist attack. This paper will review the readiness of the U.S. in preparation for the next terrorist attack and the ability to respond to that attack. My research will be qualitative in method and analysis in an attempt to produce a powerful projection of the U.S. readiness for the next terrorist attack. After reviewing twelve Scholarly articles or books the following question is presented. Is the U.S. prepared for another 9/11 terrorist attack? FindingsIn the pre-9/11 article CatastrophicTerrorism Elements of a National Policy, Carter explained that the U.S. was not victorious the threat of terrorism, as they had known in that generation, seriously (Carter, Deutch and Zelikow 1998). In the aftermath of the embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania which killed hundreds Carter did not feel that the U.S. government was committed to address terroristic threats nor was it fitly prepared for a catastrophic terror ist event.Carter gave a prophetic warning that a catastrophic event was plausible in 1998. Terrorist networks were no longer concealment in the shadow as they did during the Cold War. The Preventive Defense strategy, at that time, was outdated. Terrorist networks were embracing change, embedding with organized crime syndicates, drug and human traffickers, and m nonpareily wash which created the basic infrastructure of a terrorist organization. During this same time frame we axiom the effects of globalization in the Sub-Sahara Africa as it folded in on its self and created lawless safe havens for terrorist organizations to freely operate. Carter predicted a catastrophic terror event would be a watershed event in U.S. history that would change law, challenge personal liberties, and ultimately make terrorism the focus of our national defense strategy (6). Carter and his team were virtually ignored until 9/11.In the aftermath of 9/11 Zelikow sat on the 9/11 Commission. Many of the fin dings that the 9/11 Commission determined came from the 1998 article. Ultimately, the Department of country of origin Security (DHS) creation was in response to the large number of listed intelligence and operational failures among U.S. governmental agencies. These failures were over classification of intelligence, escape of information sharing, interagency competition in investigations, and multiple agencies conducting the same redundant tasks to name few. During DHSs instauration twenty- two federal agencies and 170,000 employees, which specialized in various disciplines ranging from lawenforcement to disaster mitigation, were pulled under the control of DHS in order to streamline information sharing and overall interagency cooperation.In the years that followed many studies and communicates to congress on the DHS pop the question that the organization needed to be reformed due to over-all mismanagement and lack of any institutional control over the multiple agencies. The pri mary fence for concern is the organizations layer of bureaucratic red tape and governmental appointees who lack the ability and structural knowledge are hampering the Secretary of Homeland Defenses ability to lead U.S. security efforts (Carafano and Heyman, DHS 2.0 Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security 2004).The DHS has a leviathan surface mission as it pertains to keeping the U.S. safe from terrorist activity. In 2003 report, Major care Challenges and Program Risks Department of Homeland Security, the Government accounting Office (GAO) describe the DHS was a high jeopardize organization for three reasons. First, the organization is too large to manage efficiently. The DHS creation is in response to the events of 9/11 without having a command structure properly planned. Second, among the 22 agencies under the DHS umbrella, there was a large amount of discord, strife, and competition before the merger. The merger did not quell the conflict, it actually added to the co mpetition for funding and resourcefulnesss. Third, these failures expose the U.S. to other possibilities in regards to terrorism (Governement Accounting Office 2003).The GAO further outlines what DHS needs to do to ease some of the existing challenges they face now and in the future. DHS moldiness in effect integrate discording agencies in order to foster an environment of partnerships and working environments. DHS must(prenominal) adopt and use public and private partnership business methods, as most of the protection Flynn mentioned earlier has fallen on the private sphere and the dependency of first responders. The private sector controls 85 % of the critical infrastructure in the nation. Indeed, unless a terrorists target is a military or other secure government facility, the first responders will almost surely be civilians (9/11 Commission 2004).Finally, the DHS infrastructure must incorporate the maximal use of its brightest and best individuals and must foster interagen cy cooperation among multiple organizations and countries simultaneously (pg. 1).Since 9/11 the U.S. has not experienced another 9/11 terrorist event, one could assume the DHS and the U.S. War on Terror is having a significant continue on terrorist activity. In 2011, The Heritage Foundation reported 40 terrorist plots had been thwarted since 9/11due to the efforts of DHS employees and power granted under the patriot Act (Carafano and Zuckerman, War on Terrorism 40 Terrorists Attacks Foiled Since 9/11 2011). Although the PATRIOT Act granted law enforcement agencies nationwide powers and abilities they did not have pre 9/11, the agency has stonewalled terror attacks on U.S. soil, and it is still failing at multiple aims.At this point, it would not be wise to assume the U.S. is 100 pct safe from terror attacks or more importantly the ability or readiness to respond to one. The DHS track record for responding to natural disasters in the U.S. is poor, at best. adept example is the DH S response to Hurricane Katrina. By the time Hurricane Katrina had made landfall the DHS had not established the roles and responsibilities that the public and private sectors would play in the survival and recovery of naked Orleans, even though the energy and shipping facilities had been considered, national critical infrastructure for which the U.S. government should take substantial responsibility in the event of a disaster (Military Technology 2005). This is where Flynn related this wasnt rocket science it just was not completed in a timely manner.There have been a number of theories for the dysfunction of the DHS as it pertains to disaster response. One primary theory is DHS does not have its priorities straight. DHS creation in response to the attacks of 9/11, with its primary focus being on prevention of future attacks. DHS thought process can be seen as one sided as 75 percent of the 3.35 billion in Federal grants were designated for counter-terrorism activities (pg. 104). Additionally, DHS was charged with not fully notifying local and stateleaders about the magnitude of the event and many mass-causality centers were diverted to Iraq and Afghanistan leaving the homeland under sourced.Of the 22 agencies that fall under DHS the Federal Emergency care Agency (FEMA) has borne the brunt of the fallout in responding to disaster events. Prior to 9/11 FEMA held a footlocker direct position within the chairpersonial Cabinet and responded to incidents with competence, ability, and utilized lessons conditioned to prevent the same mistakes in the future. Under the authority of DHS, FEMA lost its cabinet level position, lost independent funding, and FEMAs competency and performance decreased significantly. advertise adding to the dysfunction within the DHS and FEMAs ability to respond to incidents are the political ramifications of power sharing amongst the Federal government and state agencies. In response to Hurricane Katrina, the Federal government to inc lude the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the whitened House could not determine if utilizing Active Duty would violate the posse Comitatus Act. The DHS and White House did not want to take Constitutional rights outdoor(a) from the states. This delay furthered much needed service to the hardest hit areas of the Gulf Coast. WAL-MART had a quicker response time of getting much need supplies into New Orleans exclusively was unable to do enter and provide assistance due to the bureaucratic boondoggle in Washington (Abouo-Bakr 2013).In 2007 and 2009, FEMA participated in a national-level exercise aimed at assessing U.S. capacity to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from a large-scale disaster (Busch 2012). In the following months after these breeding exercises it was reported FEMA did not effectively manage, track, or maintain and failed to complete less than 40 percent of corrective actions noted (pg. 18). FEMA also failed to provide a training out line to address the corrective actions to ensure the mistakes made and lessons learned could be used at future training events in preparation for real life responses to disasters.ConclusionThe U.S. has thwarted terrorist attacks on the U.S., on two foreign anddomestic fronts, since the historic events of 9/11. The additional powers granted to the DHS under the PATRIOT Act have aided law enforcement agencies and anti-terrorism activities in the War on Terrorism. The question is not how well the DHS prevents future attacks it is a question of when the next attack will happen and how will the U.S. respond.In order for the DHS to become successful the Secretary of Homeland Defense must line up organizational and logistical support across all 22 agencies. The monetary focus of the DHS must be distributed equally along the other agencies supporting(a) the relief efforts in the event another terrorist event occurs on U.S. soil. The DHS must foster an environment that encourages employe es to create Private Public Partnerships (PPP). These partnerships must have a clear and concise plan and all players involved must have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities as it pertains to information and resource sharing during a response to a terror event.The relationship between the DHS and PPP must foster long-term projects and must initially come from within the DHS. FEMA should be removed the organizational tree of DHS and have its cabinet level position re-established and given the ability to meet directly with the President of the United States and all emergency response assets nationwide. FEMAs ability must be restored to pre-9/11 levels in order to meet all future natural disasters or terrorist attacks. The USG must network with the private sector and ensure the plans created do not hamper their bottom line and ensure the cost/risk ratio is sufficient to stock holders in the private sector.The DHS and FEMA have apply some of the lessons learned in past response efforts and Congress has moody some of them into law. The two most important laws will assist FEMA in emergency management. First, the head of FEMA must be an emergency management overlord and have least five years executive experience. Second, during a disaster, the lines of communication between the President and FEMA are open without interruption from the DHS (King, et al. 2009).The changes to law were a small step for FEMA but now allow them to coordinate with all organizations along the National Incident Management System and the National Response Framework. Both of the programs describe how multiple players from the lowest level to the Director of FEMA how they should work together in response to an incident. Both of these programs are balance to react to an incident whether it is a terrorist event or a natural disaster, but they still have a long way to go.The DHS prevents attacks well but at times fails miserably in response efforts due to interagency shortfa lls. Until there is a balance between the efforts carried out in the War on Terror and the response efforts after an event the U.S. will not be prepared for the next attack.References9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Comission Report. July 26, 2004. www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (accessed 12 29, 2013). Abouo-Bakr, C. Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships. Washington, DC Georgetown University Press, 2013. Busch, Jason. FEMA Falters in Self-Improvement. News Network, November 2012 18. Carafano, James, and David Heyman. DHS 2.0 Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security. Special Report SR-02, Washington The Heritage Foundation, 2004. Carafano, James, and Jessica Zuckerman. War on Terrorism 40 Terrorists Attacks Foiled Since 9/11 . September 7, 2011. http//www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/09/40-terror-plots-foiled-since-9-11-combating-complacency-in-the-long-war-on-terror (accessed 12 24, 2013). Carter, Ashton B,, jakes M. Deutch, and Philip D. Zelikow. Catasrophic Terrorism Elements of a National Policy. Visions of Governance for the Twenty-First Century, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1998. Flynn, Stephen. The Next Attack. The Washington Monthly, March 2007 31-37. Governement Accounting Office. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks Department of Hoeland Security. Series Report, Washington United States General Accounting Office, 2003. King, Peter, et al. Keep FEMA within Homeland Security. January 14, 2009. http//search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bwh&a

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